The Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement concluded negotiations in November 2024. The agreement, due to come into force in 2025, has great potential to economically benefit both nations, particularly Indonesia. But there are many challenges that, unless proactively addressed, will prevent Indonesia from taking full advantage of the deal.
The Canada–Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) concluded negotiations in November 2024, with Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau committing to signing the agreement in 2025. While the CEPA has great potential to boost Indonesia’s economy, there are still many challenges that could hinder Indonesia from maximising the benefits of this agreement.
Indonesia and Canada begun negotiating the CEPA in 2021, and after 10 rounds of negotiations, the two countries finally reached a deal. This is Indonesia’s first official economic partnership with a North American country, marking a new chapter of bilateral relations.
Through this agreement, Canada aims to tap into Indonesia’s large consumer market and strengthen its engagement in Southeast Asia, while Indonesia seeks to gain access to North American markets and investments. The agreement will eliminate over 90.5 per cent of import tariffs on Indonesian goods, increase investment and promote greater economic collaboration between the two countries.
The CEPA could help Indonesia realise its aspiration to become a high-income country by 2045. The Canadian government’s economic impact assessment projected that the agreement could increase Indonesia’s GDP by US$1.1 billion and its export to Canada by US$877 million, mainly through increased Indonesian export of clothing and leather products.
While the economic outlook is hopeful, there are still many challenges facing Indonesia. Indonesian exports may struggle in the Canadian market due to limited public awareness of Indonesia and its products. Many Canadians know little of Indonesia and are more familiar with its smaller neighbours, such as Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. According to a 2024 poll by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, only 11 per cent of Canadians consider themselves to be ‘knowledgeable’ about Indonesia. Similarly, most Indonesians are only vaguely aware of Canada.
It is not surprising that bilateral trade has been lacklustre, totalling only US$3.78 billion in 2023. Meanwhile, Vietnam and Thailand respectively exported US$9.85 billion and US$3.63 billion worth of goods to Canada in 2023.
Structural issues, including regulatory complexity, poor infrastructure and a low-skilled workforce, discourage Canadian companies from doing business in Indonesia. According to the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business index, Indonesia is ranked 73 out of 190 countries, indicating that Indonesia has a particularly challenging business environment, which is a deterrent for foreign firms.
The CEPA does not automatically overcome all the barriers to successful economic cooperation between Indonesia and Canada. The implementation of this agreement requires Canada and Indonesia to proactively work together to strengthen economic ties. Canada has already begun working to support the CEPA.
In 2023, Canada set up an Export Development Canada representation office in Jakarta to assist Canadian companies that want to do business in Indonesia. In December 2024, the Team Canada Trade Mission, led by Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development Mary Ng, sent representatives from over 190 Canadian firms and organisations to Indonesia to deepen partnerships between Canadian and Indonesian businesses. The visit also produced several memorandums of understanding between Canadian and Indonesian firms. Further, Canada’s Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen visited Jakarta in February 2025 to meet with Indonesia’s Minister of Environment and Minister for National Development Planning to explore opportunities for further enhancing the economic cooperation between the two countries.
Jakarta must take advantage of the CEPA by delivering reforms that will entice Canadian firms to do business in Indonesia. Though many of Indonesia’s structural issues will take years to resolve, there are practical measures that the Indonesian government should take to help both Canadian and Indonesian firms maximise the benefits of the CEPA.
Just as Canada sent its trade mission to Indonesia in December 2024, Jakarta should send Indonesian firms to Canada, especially firms in key sectors identified in the CEPA, such as agriculture, energy, manufacturing and technology.
Jakarta should also give preferential treatment to Canadian firms who wish to obtain Indonesian business licenses, which currently involves a lengthy and laborious process. This will alleviate the financial burden and uncertainty faced by Canadian firms in Indonesia. The government should also allocate more resources to the Indonesia Trade Promotion Center and Indonesia Trade Attache in Canada to facilitate more commerce activities between Canada and Indonesia.
The government of Indonesia needs to take a proactive role to address existing challenges. The CEPA has great potential to help Indonesia achieve its economic aspirations, but without active participation from Jakarta, the CEPA’s potential will go to waste. Now the CEPA negotiators have returned home, the hard work of building economic ties must begin.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver and serves on the board of the Canada Indonesia Chamber of Commerce.
The book that I co-authored with Dr. Ross Michael Pink “Understanding Human Security and Climate Change” has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing in September 2024.
Overview of the book:
This book provides a fascinating overview of the climate change phenomenon worldwide, with specific case study profiles of eight countries. The important theme of human security is highlighted in each chapter because the human security paradigm is the responsible human rights approach to climate change challenges.
The book provides a diverse range of country profiles to give the readers context with regards to climate change and clear case study examples from which to view the impact of climate change on human populations. The country profiles also give the readers a detailed overview of specific countries and their particular climate challenges and efforts towards workable solutions.
One cannot walk along the climate change road without giving due respect to human rights. Accordingly, the human security paradigm notes seven threats to citizens that are exacerbated by climate change. These threats include:
1. Economic threat, e.g. poverty, unemployment, low economic productivity, and income inequality. 2. Food threat, e.g. decreased agricultural production, increased in food prices, lack of healthy and culturally appropriate food. 3. Health threat, e.g. increase in infectious diseases, poor access to healthcare, malnutrition. 4. Environmental threat, e.g. droughts, deterioration of water sources, deforestation, and degradation of natural habitat. 5. Personal threat, e.g. increase in personal violence, increase in injuries and mortality due to natural disasters. 6. Community threat, e.g. community conflicts, deterioration of local customand cultural practices, forced migration of local communities due to water scarcity. 7. Political threat, e.g. deterioration of democratic institutions, political violence and repression, state-sponsored human rights violations.
The book also contains analysis and commentary by prominent individuals from the political, human rights, academic worlds. These leaders were selected for their knowledge of and specialization in their respective countries, which will enhance climate change and human security understanding. An important goal of the book is to engage the readers in the urgent climate change–human security dialogue. This dialogue will contribute to a better understanding of climate change and its multiple challenges confronting human populations in a diverse range of countries.
‘Pink and Dhofier have made a major contribution to the literature on climate change. Their sweeping work concentrates on the human security aspects of the crisis, the top priority when assessing its effects. With well chosen examples from a spectrum of geographic areas, they successfully convey the enormity of the problem and reinforce our understanding of the urgency to act.’ – Tom Mulcair, Former Leader of the Federal National Democratic Party of Canada
‘Human security is put forward as a rights-based approach to the assessment of climate change. Threats are identified and case studies then provide context, for example, identifying high costs of mitigation faced by aboriginal peoples in Canada. This superb volume should be required reading in the academic and policy communities.’ – Patrick James, University of Southern California, US
Co-authored with Randolph Mank, Global Business Executive and former Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
After decades of hesitancy, the Canadian government is now vigorously pursuing relations with Indonesia, the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Officials are negotiating a bilateral comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA).1
Trade talks with Indonesia were launched in 2021, with the sixth session scheduled for this fall. Canadian foreign and trade ministers’ visits to Jakarta earlier this year and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit this month have boosted the momentum. Trudeau announced the establishment of an export development office in Jakarta to be headed by a new Indo-Pacific trade representative, who will no doubt need to co-ordinate with Canada’s already appointed special envoy for the Indo-Pacific.2 This is all happening in parallel with negotiations for a trade deal with ASEAN and these initiatives form a central part of Canada’s earnest Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in 2022.3
Admittedly, most Canadians would have trouble finding Indonesia on a map. Many have heard of its most famous tourist island, Bali, and even about its tiny island neighbour, Singapore. But most are only vaguely aware of Indonesia’s 17,000 islands, with exotic names like Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Borneo and Papua, sprawled across the Indian and Pacific oceans, whose 279 million inhabitants make up the fourth most populous country in the world.4 Similarly, Indonesians would have scant awareness of Canada, too. They are not a major source of immigration and the diaspora is negligible, certainly dwarfed by fellow ASEAN members the Philippines and Vietnam.
So it’s worth sorting out hope versus reality in our pursuit of a comprehensive economic partnership.
With a GDP of $1.5 trillion, Indonesia is already the 16th largest economy, just behind Spain, and growing.5 Goldman Sachs projects it to become the fourth largest economy in the world by 2050.6 Unlike its aging ASEAN neighbours, over 50 per cent of Indonesia’s population is between 18 and 39 years old, which makes it one of the fastest growing consumer markets and labour forces in the world.7 It is, therefore, a potentially large market if Canadian companies wish to pursue it.
Yet current bilateral trade is a rather modest $6 billion, not quite the equivalent of two days of trade with the U.S., which totals $1.2 trillion annually.8 Indonesia imports mostly wheat, fertilizer and wood pulp from us and sells us machinery, rubber and textiles in return.9 Our wheat exports make particular sense: the world’s largest flour mill is the ever-expanding Bogasari Mill, owned by Indofood at the port of Jakarta.10
Canadian companies have invested some $5.7 billion in Indonesia. The government has also donated over $1 billion in development assistance since the year 2000 alone. Indonesian investment in Canada stands at only $126 million by comparison.11 Much smaller Malaysia actually remains Canada’s largest ASEAN investment partner. Despite being scaled back from its original $36 billion investment, its national energy company, Petronas, still holds a 25 per cent stake in LNG Canada, worth some $18 billion.12
The relatively limited nature of bilateral exchange with Indonesia means that trade negotiators must comb through trade data to look for areas where more commerce could be stimulated through tariff reductions and other regulatory changes. For those not familiar with trade negotiations, those trade data are found in the harmonized system (HS) codes compiled by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which includes some 5,300 export and import product descriptions arranged in 99 chapters and grouped in 21 sections.13 If that’s not laborious enough, negotiators must also ensure that the affected domestic industries must be thoroughly consulted on any new commitments and cohere with those already made in the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bilateral agreements, including the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). It’s complex and tedious, to say the least.
Increased trade and investment are worthy goals, but broader bilateral co-operation faces headwinds.
On Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy, it’s true that Indonesia sits across from Malaysia alongside the Malacca Strait, through which some 25 per cent of world trade, including oil, flows.14 Theoretically, it could be pivotal should a U.S.-China conflict ever lead to a shipping blockade. It’s also true that Indonesia’s “independent and active” (“bebas aktif”) foreign policy makes it a potential player in geopolitics.15 But it would take very special circumstances to make it an actual security partner in any regional conflict. Nor would Canada have much to contribute to the region’s security, besides solidarity, despite ASEAN signing on Canada as a strategic partner during Trudeau’s visit.
Like all countries, Indonesia follows its own interests. It participates in both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.16 Despite a maritime dispute, China is its largest trading partner by far at $65 billion bilaterally last year, purchasing such valuable Indonesian commodities as oil, coal and minerals. Trade with the U.S., Japan and India follows far behind in the low $20 billion range each.17 Clearly, Indonesia would be reluctant to participate willingly in any such blockade, or even to take sides, if it ever came to that. Notably, there are no U.S. military bases in Indonesia.
As a potential Indo-Pacific ally, or not, it’s good that Indonesia seems to have put its history of troubled relations with neighbouring Australia behind it. Still, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has criticized the World Bank and the IMF and called for a new international economic system focusing on emerging powers.18 Though he hasn’t yet decided on joining the growing BRICS group of countries, he seems to share its goals.
Indonesia does not appear to be an obvious partner for our progressive foreign policy agenda, either. True, it has emerged from authoritarian rule to become a vibrant democracy. But as the world’s largest Muslim country and a founder and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),19 its socio-political culture and foreign policy are inherently distinct from ours. While most Indonesians practise a moderate form of Islam, conservative pressures have increased in recent years. Former Jakarta governor Basuki Purnama, known as Ahok, was jailed for two years on charges of blasphemy for insulting the Qur’an.20 Recently, the government has also formally banned sex outside of marriage.21
There are also uncertainties around democratic continuity. The leading candidate in next year’s presidential elections is Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, a former general and an avowed authoritarian populist with a troubling human rights record.22 Indonesia’s still fragile democracy could face a setback if Prabowo wins.
So if trade is modest and geopolitical interests and foreign and domestic policy diverge, where might we find tangible overlapping interests? One interesting niche area relates to automobiles, our largest economic sector. The Canadian government has set a policy of ensuring that by 2035 all new light-duty vehicles sold will be electric (EVs).23 With the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act pouring billions of dollars into EV battery production, Canada has had to keep pace in the integrated North American auto sector.24 Up to $15 billion in taxpayer-funded incentives have been announced for battery plants being built by Stellantis in Windsor and Volkswagen in St. Thomas, Ontario.25
What does that have to do with Indonesia? Most EV batteries contain up to 80 per cent nickel. We mostly hear about China’s dominance in refining minerals, which is very real. But the world’s largest producer of nickel happens to be Indonesia, with 37 per cent of world market share (followed far behind by the Philippines at 14 per cent and Russia at nine per cent; Canada is sixth with five per cent of market share).26 Indonesia is also second after the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the source of cobalt, another important ingredient.27
Coincidentally, Indonesia achieved this position with the help of Canadian mining company Inco, then the world’s largest nickel mining company and the largest investor in Indonesia’s mining sector. In addition to its operations in Sudbury, Ontario, Inco has been mining nickel in Sulawesi since 1968.
Before imagining that this automatically benefits Canada, consider the complex nature of the global nickel mining business. Brazilian mining giant Vale bought Inco Canada for $19 billion in 2006. Vale now owns the Indonesian mine, as well as Canada’s largest nickel mining operation at Voisey’s Bay in Newfoundland and Labrador and the Thompson mine in Manitoba. Glencore of Switzerland actually owns the Raglan mine in Quebec and another in Sudbury, as well. Canada still has 127 of the more than 186 nickel mines in operation globally.28 We export just over $5 billion worth of nickel annually, while we import just under $1 billion as well, mostly from the U.S.29
But the most relevant issue is pricing. The Indonesian government is a potential market mover. It has also signalled its intention to export into the EV battery supply chain and has introduced a law prohibiting the export of unrefined ore, both measures aimed at attracting investment and maintaining favourable export pricing.30 Even if Canada’s domestic nickel production were to increase, the corporations involved in EV battery production would still have to pay world prices determined in large measure by Indonesia.
Whether this leaves Indonesia as a partner or a competitor is hard to assess. We do not import nickel from Indonesia and securing favourable supplies from Indonesia is not in our Indo-Pacific Strategy. Chinese investors, by contrast, are already moving in.
Again, while pondering this rather inadvertent link with Indonesia, it’s wise to maintain a realistic business perspective. Indonesia is about as far away from Canada as one can travel around the globe before starting to come back. Distance does matter for supply chains, which we are allegedly trying to bring closer to home. So does corruption. Transparency International ranks Indonesia 110th out of 180 countries on its corruption rankings. (Least corrupt at number one is Denmark; Canada ranks 14th.)31 This is a very real problem for Canadians doing business there, and Indonesian courts are not known for consistent adjudication. Occasionally, Canadians have been imprisoned for minor offences, leading to bilateral consular irritants. Before being released in 2019, Canadian teacher Neil Bantleman spent five years in prison in Indonesia for crimes he did not commit.32
On human rights, Indonesia rejected a UN motion to debate China’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims.33 Indonesia’s Chinese minorities, which tend to dominate the business sector, have also suffered violent attacks during periods of political upheaval.34 And those mining operations mentioned above have faced citizen protests over large-scale environmental damage and local human rights abuses.35 In an infamous historical footnote, it was actually protests against former Indonesian president Suharto’s government that led to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police using pepper spray to disperse demonstrators at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vancouver in November 1997.36
Last, but not least, Indonesia has severe infrastructure problems. Its capital city, Jakarta, is actually sinking so fast that in 2022, the government began work on building Nusantara, a new capital 1,000 kilometres away in East Kalimantan, Borneo. It’s scheduled to be inaugurated in August 2024 and proceed in phases.37 Like other countries, Canada will have to decide when and if to shift its embassy. As the megaproject comes to fruition, it will be highly disruptive to regular political, commercial and consular business.
None of this is meant to rain on the current bilateral parade. Far from it. Positive sentiment on both sides is most welcome. If the respective business communities respond as they should to the efforts the two governments are making, trade and investment in commodities and other products and services should grow in quantity and value. But the inevitable challenges and frustrations along the way for these two very distant and different countries could be exacerbated by inflated expectations. In navigating the way forward, wide-eyed pragmatism will provide a better foundation than naïve hope.
7 Guy Allison, Chloe De Schryver, Jane Goldthorpe, Emily Gunn, Claire Jansen, Tegan Morris and Mollie Nielsen, “Next Generation Indonesia,” The British Council, October 2022, doi.org/10.57884/8B8K-B514.
16 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Indonesia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A Pivotal State’s Hedging Strategy,” Asian Politics & Policy, April 19, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12629.
Randolph Mank is a former Canadian diplomat and business executive in Asia. He heads MankGlobal consulting, serves on boards and is a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Triple Helix and the Balsillie School of International Affairs.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver Chapter. He has worked as a policy analyst for various public, private, and non-profit institutions across Canada. He holds a Masters in Public Policy and Global Affairs from the University of British Columbia specializing in global climate policy.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.
In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.
This opinion piece was co-authored with my colleague at the Canadian Urban Institute (CUI). It is based on our work in designing the Housing Accelerator Fund (HAF), a Federal government of Canada’s $4B funding program to accelerate the construction of homes across Canada. Original article can be found on Municipal World.
The shortage of housing supply is a hotly debated issue in Canada. A 2021 report by Scotiabank suggests that Canada’s ongoing housing crisis is rooted in the “chronic insufficiency of home supply,” highlighting the fact that Canada has the lowest number of homes per 1,000 residents compared to its G7 counterparts. The same narrative is echoed by Murtaza Haider, a Toronto Metropolitan University professor who argues that supply is both the main cause and solution to the housing crisis in Canada. On the other hand, BMO Capital Market economists argue that the supply shortage narrative is overstated. CUI research also suggested that the creation of residential units in Canada grew faster than its household growth from 2016-2021. While Canada’s housing problems are more complex than mere supply and demand gaps, there is a recognition that increasing the supply of housing is crucial to address the ongoing housing crisis in the country. The challenge lies in making sure that the housing built addresses local housing needs.
The federal government’s Budget 2022 includes a $4 billion investment to deliver a new Housing Accelerator Fund (HAF) to create 100,000 net new housing units over the next five years. In response, the Canadian Urban Institute (CUI) worked with the Big City Executive Partnership (BiCEP) to coordinate insights and recommendations from eight of Canada’s largest cities on how the HAF could be most effectively designed and implemented to accelerate the provision of housing units in those key markets and reflect local challenges and opportunities.
To develop the ‘best policy advice’, CUI launched a “Design Sprint,” undertaken in collaboration with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), to gather input from the Big City Executive Partnership (BiCEP), a partnership between Canada’s eight largest cities convened by CUI. BiCEP is led by City Managers and Chief Administrators and supported by senior management, in eight of Canada’s largest cities. BiCEP was formed with three main objectives: to forge relationships and share learning among its members; to strengthen partnerships and collaboration between BiCEP and other levels of government; and to seek out new ideas and approaches to the challenges faced by Canada’s largest cities. In the early months of COVID, BiCEP was instrumental in helping senior staff work to collaboratively problem solve and share ideas in an unprecedented time. In the context of HAF, BiCEP provided a valuable platform for providing program design and implementation advice to the federal government. In addition to working with key municipal staff, through the BiCEP membership, CUI also engaged housing experts and industry representatives from across the country to gather their input on the design and implementation of the HAF.
The culmination of CUI’s work undertaken with BiCEP underscores the importance of coordinating integrated planning and investment that connects federal policy and spending priorities with local needs and capacity.
The 12-week Design Sprint drew on the collective knowledge of key municipal stakeholders and other housing experts to identify program design principles, investment categories, and a detailed understanding of each City’s unique housing supply needs. The Design Sprint produced a set of high-level principles to guide the design and implementation of the HAF. These six principles are:
Flexible – the HAF should provide maximum flexibility on eligible costs, types of supply, and other parameters
Performance-based – the HAF should reward Cities’ achievements in increasing the housing supply and not penalize Cities for their achievements in increasing the housing supply
Simple – the HAF must be transparent and minimize complexity for all levels of government and other stakeholders
Predictable – the HAF should provide a high level of predictability on funding eligibility, amount, and timing
Aligned and stackable – the HAF must be aligned with federal and municipal housing priorities and be stackable with other federal and provincial housing programs
Rapid – The HAF must be deployed quickly and responsively while unlocking or incentivizing opportunities in cities and city-regions
Transformational – the HAF must reward activities that transform planning and approval processes to increase the housing supply
These principles helped to inform program design advice aligned with specific City housing needs and areas where Cities could have the greatest influence on increasing the housing supply.
Housing is a complex issue and varies from one city to another
The Design Sprint process helped unpack the diverse local contexts and concerns that necessitate each City to accelerate housing supply specific to their needs and opportunities. For example, Vancouver and Toronto, the two cities with the hottest housing markets in the country, are geographically constrained and rely on infill development, which, from a planning and servicing standpoint, is more complex than greenfield development. Meanwhile, Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa, and Halifax are still developing housing in undeveloped areas of the city while also trying to address and increase infill housing and housing affordability through a variety of mechanisms including policy, incentives, and process improvements.
The details revealed through in-depth engagement with Cities and stakeholders reinforced the argument that Canada’s housing crisis is more than just a supply shortage issue. For example, the Design Sprint’s findings suggest that certain types of housing are more difficult to produce while also being those most in need; this includes the decline in purpose-built rental housing, the escalating problem of housing affordability, and housing built to ensure that households are living close to public transit, jobs, and essential services. Physical constraints or pre-existing characteristics such as contaminated lands, infrastructure capacity, and context-specific adjacencies are limiting the ability of denser cities to develop housing units. As such, increasing the housing supply without considering these local contexts and challenges will not work. To be successful, the Cities argued, HAF had to account for the specificity of each context and to solve the unique situation in each municipality.
Cities’ priorities and preferences
CUI worked with representatives of each of the eight BiCEP Cities to create “Policy Briefs” to summarize, understand and communicate housing needs and housing supply issues, which were substantiated by a variety of data. This information was supported by knowledge of the development pipeline to understand the number and type of housing units within each City’s planning approvals process and to define the municipal levers to move more units through the development process.
Through these detailed Policy Briefs, the HAF engagement process aimed to answer the following question: “What types of investments and actions on the part of municipalities will make a significant contribution to HAF program goals?” The answers provided by the eight Cities can be combined into four areas of investment or intervention: 1) planning and policy; 2) process improvements; 3) land and infrastructure investments; 4) targeted incentives for certain unit types. Many Cities also identified capital funding for affordable and below-market units as a key priority, yet this was not included in the four investment categories as HAF was explicitly not intended to focus on funding for specific housing projects.
In addition to establishing the areas where Cities could most impact housing supply delivery, the Design Sprint also identified where the Cities could not. There was clear feedback that many of the issues impacting the delivery of housing are out of the purview of the Cities, namely supply chain issues, cost of financing, labour shortages, and developer speculation or lack of capacity. City representatives also noted that a great deal of work had already been undertaken to speed up approvals and bring more units to market. They suggested that HAF should not, therefore, penalize the early adopters of planning and process changes, nor should it set a target for new development based on recent housing creation that would punish Cities that had accelerated their housing supply in previous years. Cities also communicated that HAF should have some conditionality linked to specific, local housing needs and supply issues so as to not simply reward housing that would otherwise already be built. Finally, Cities agreed that for HAF to be successful, other programs of the National Housing Strategy would need to be evaluated, revamped, and fully funded. Otherwise, there is the risk that Cities will look to HAF to fund housing gaps where other programs have not.
Conclusion and Reflection The Design Sprint illustrates the level of complexity in Canada’s housing market and the importance of drawing lessons from local expertise to understand the unique situation in each city. Coordinating integrated planning and investments that connect federal policy and spending priorities with local needs and capacity is therefore paramount to the success of federal housing programs. The Design Sprint also shows that housing cannot be considered in isolation from other urban investments. Housing needs to be integrated with transit and economic development into coordinated plans that reflect local priorities and capacities. The design and implementation of federal housing programs must therefore be a multigovernmental and multistakeholder process where local officials and stakeholders are engaged in a meaningful way, and where conditionality is built into the program to provide opportunities for Cities to align local housing goals with national priorities.
Climate change is impacting the global security landscape, and experts have warned about climate change’s implications on security risks such as political instability and conflicts.
Photo by Wikimedia Commons, taken by the National Observer.
Originally posted by the National Observer. Link to original article can be found here
The impacts of climate change on security issues such as political instability and mass migrations are well-documented. It is time for Canada to make climate change a national security priority and develop a national climate security plan.
Climate change is impacting the global security landscape. Security experts have warned about climate change’s implications on security risks such as political instability and conflicts. At the recent United Nations Security Council open debate on climate change and world peace, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged world leaders to step up their efforts to address climate security. Despite these warnings, Ottawa does not have a national climate security strategy, which leaves Canada vulnerable to security risks related to climate change.
Climate change has been generally considered an environmental issue. But military scholars call climate change a “threat multiplier” that can intensify a wide range of security issues. Globally, climate-related disasters such as floods, wildfires, droughts and storms have led to food insecurity, water shortages, loss of properties and poverty. These social and economic grievances can increase many security risks such as wars, terrorism and forced migrations.
In places like Yemen and Afghanistan, climate change impacts have exacerbated conflicts between communities and complicated the ongoing peacebuilding efforts. On island nations such as Kiribati, rising sea levels and saltwater intrusions have forced people to leave their homes. According to some estimates, climate change could displace more than 1.2 billion people globally by 2050.
As past and ongoing events have demonstrated, political instability and conflicts in other parts of the world can undermine Canada’s national security.
Climate change is already putting pressure on Canada’s military. In 2019, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan said there has been a growing need for the Canadian Armed Forces to provide disaster relief at home and overseas. Currently, there are more Canadian troops deployed to provide disaster relief at home than to operations overseas. An internal Department of Defence analysis found climate impacts will increase security risks and the demand for Canadian troops in African countries. Climate change also presents risks to Canada’s defence infrastructure and equipment. For example, Canadian naval bases in Halifax and Esquimalt are prone to sea-level rise, which may impact Canada’s readiness to respond to other security threats.
Climate change is also undermining Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The melting Arctic ice has opened up the Northwest Passage and allowed world powers such as the U.S. and Russia to increase their military presence in the region. China’s growing interest in the Arctic Ocean for its cargo ships also poses a new challenge to Canada’s security interest in the Arctic.
Canada’s defence strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, highlights the military’s commitment to “bolster its ability to respond to severe weather events and other natural disasters, both at home and abroad.” But the Department of Defence alone cannot address climate security. In its new climate plan, “A Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy,” Ottawa outlines 64 ambitious measures to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions. Unfortunately, this plan does not address climate security nor explain how Canada will adapt to climate impacts.
Canada must develop a national strategy to protect Canadians from security risks related to climate change. The federal government should first incorporate this strategy into its climate plan to ensure it is consistent with the country’s overall approach to tackling climate change.
Moreover, the government needs to immediately fulfil its promise to develop a national adaptation strategy to ensure communities can respond to climate impacts. Increasing community resilience to climate change will reduce potential damage associated with climate disasters and the demand for the Canadian Forces’ help for disaster relief. Ottawa also needs to work with other countries to minimize security risks related to climate change globally, such as monitoring climate risks in hot spots. Additionally, Canada should focus its official development assistance on helping vulnerable countries increase their climate adaptation capacity.
Climate-related disasters will create global catastrophes of epic proportions. The absence of a holistic strategy to address climate security will put Canada’s national security in a precarious situation. The time is now for Ottawa to put climate change at the heart of its national security and develop a plan that will enable Canada to tackle climate security.
After Canada lost its bid for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat on June 17, experts quickly blamed Ottawa’s lack of global engagement as the key reason. But Canada’s defeat tells of more than just its foreign policy failure. On many domestic issues, such as the environment and Indigenous rights, Canada’s actions are not consistent with its international obligations.
As one of the founding members of the United Nations (UN), Canada’s defeat in the bid for the UNSC seat is a stark reminder of Canada’s deteriorating global influence. Canada lost to Norway and Ireland in the first round of voting, despite Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s intense and expensive campaign for nearly five years.
The council has the power to deploy peacekeeping operations, impose sanctions, and determine the UN’s response to international security threats. As such, a seat on the UNSC would have enabled Canada to regain its global influence and help shape the future of the world that is becoming more interconnected and complex.
Canada was traditionally known as a middle power that championed a multilateral world. But in recent years, Canada has disengaged itself from the world. Since 1970, Ottawa has continuously reduced its spending on foreign aid. Today, Canada only spends 0.28 per cent of its gross national income (GNI) on international development assistance. Meanwhile, Norway and Ireland spend at least 0.7 per cent of their GNI on foreign aid.
The UN figures found that Canada’s peacekeeping efforts are currently at the lowest level in 60 years. At the end of April 2020, there were only 35 Canadian military and police officers in the UN peacekeeping force, despite its promise to deploy 600 military officers and 250 police officers. It is clear that Canada’s foreign policy does not reflect its rhetoric.
But Canada’s defeat signalled a much deeper problem than just its lack of global engagement. In many domestic issues, such as the environment and Indigenous rights, Canada has failed to uphold the values of the UN.
Despite being a signatory of the Paris Climate Agreement, Canada is one of the worst-performing countries in climate action. With a population of only 37 million people, Canada is one of the world’s top 10 greenhouse gas emitters. Canada is not on track to meet its target to reduce its emissions by 30 per cent below the 2005 level by 2030. According to the UN, Canada will miss its climate target by 15 per cent. A study by the Climate Action Network also found that Canada’s climate plan is in line with the global warming exceeding 4 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level.
Ottawa has indeed instituted measures to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, such as the national carbon pricing framework and investment on clean energy. The federal government has also earmarked $70-billion to address climate change. But at the same time, the government is investing heavily in the fossil fuel industry. Between 2012 and 2017, Export Development Canada (EDC) spent a staggering $62-billion to support the fossil fuel industry. Ottawa also spent $4.5-billion to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline in 2018.
Canada has also failed to uphold its commitment to Indigenous rights. Although the government of Canada officially adopted the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2016, Ottawa has yet to introduce legislation on UNDRIP. Violations against Indigenous rights continue to persist in Canada. Today, an Indigenous Canadian is 10 times more likely to die at the hands of police officers compared to a white Canadian.
Canada’s mistreatment of Indigenous groups has not gone unnoticed. Most recently, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged Ottawa to immediately suspend the construction of the Coastal GasLink pipeline, the Trans Mountain pipeline, and the Site C dam until it obtains “free, prior, and informed consent” from Indigenous peoples. The UN Human Rights Committee also ruled that the Indian Act discriminates against Indigenous women.
Canada cannot portray a moral high ground abroad while failing to address these issues at home. The recent defeat at the UN Security Council bid reveals more than Ottawa’s foreign policy failure. It is also a reminder that Canada’s international obligations extend beyond its global engagement. Therefore, Ottawa must ensure that its actions at home are consistent with its rhetoric.
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Originally published on the Hamilton Spectator, co-authored with Elmer Dysalvador.
Canada is considered a global leader in refugee protection. As a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Canada has the obligation to respect the rights of refugees and not turn them away from its border.
Since Justin Trudeau became prime minister in October 2015, Canada has admitted more than 60,000 Syrian refugees. The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily halted the trend. As part of its pandemic containment measure, Canada closed its border to refugees on March 20. With the pandemic curve starting to flatten, Canada is slowly reopening its economy and lifting some of its containment measures. But as Canadians return to a semblance of normal life, Ottawa must fulfil its commitment to protect refugees and reopen its refugee protection programs.
In 1951, the United Nations adopted the Refugee Convention to guide countries around the world to protect refugees and asylum seekers. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are currently 26 million refugees worldwide, which is about the same size as Australia’s population. But as COVID-19 forced many governments to close their borders, the future of refugees and asylum seekers have become uncertain more than ever.
Many refugees live in dense camps where access to water is scarce and physical distancing is practically impossible. In refugee camps in Greece, quarantine measures have exacerbated a problem of overcapacity in camps such as on Samos, which shelters over 6,000 refugees living in a camp with a capacity of less than 700. This has led to shortages of food and other essentials like medicines and hygiene products which are critical to the well-being of refugees. In May, the UN reported the first COVID-19 outbreak in the Kutapaling settlement in Bangladesh, which shelters around 860,000 Rohingya refugees. Officials in the field are concerned that the virus could lead to thousands of deaths and decimate the settlement.
Human rights groups have criticized Ottawa’s move to close its borders to refugee claimants as a violation of Canadian law and its commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
After months of intense restrictions, the COVID-19 infection rate in Canada has started to decline. In response, many Canadian provinces are beginning to reopen their economies. Prime Minister Trudeau has recently announced that Canada will allow immediate family members of citizens and permanent residents to come to Canada.
But Ottawa has yet to announce its approach regarding refugees and asylum seekers who have been in limbo since the government temporarily closed its borders to all but essential travel in March. It is time for Ottawa to start readmitting refugees and asylum seekers.
Reopening Canada’s refugee protection programs during a global pandemic while protecting the health of Canadians will be challenging. Therefore, there are areas that Canada needs to improve to ensure that its refugee protection programs are consistent with the new global situation. First and foremost, Ottawa must work with the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to enhance medical checks for refugees at all ports of entry.
Second, Canada should use this moment to heighten its partnerships with the UNHCR, which, as of March 17 has suspended its resettlement travel programs. As a designated referral organization, the UNHCR is responsible for identifying and referring refugees for resettlement in partner countries. Ottawa can start co-ordinating with UNHCR to gradually resume its suspended activities and ensure that its health screening process meets Canada’s standards, which can help Canada reduce the health risks associated with the movement of people.
Third, Ottawa should increase its support for not-for-profit and civil society organizations that help resettle refugees in various communities across Canada. These organizations can assist newly landed refugees to access COVID-19 prevention resources, health services and protection tools such as medical masks and disinfectants.
These are measures that Canada can do right now to comply with its own law and meet its obligations while ensuring that the health of millions of Canadians is protected.
The coming years will continue to pose new challenges to Canada’s refugee protection program and Ottawa will need to be up for the challenge.
For the last 70 years, Canada has been a world leader in the protection of displaced peoples. And with the World Refugee Day on June 20, Canada must reaffirm its international commitments to the protection of refugees.
About the authors: Elmer DySalvador is a researcher and a graduate of the Master of Public Policy and Human Development program at the United Nations University-MERIT, Netherlands. Luthfi Dhofier is a policy analyst and a writer based in Vancouver, B.C. He holds a master of public policy and global affairs from the University of British Columbia.
Originally published on The Globe Post. Op-ed written by Luthfi Dhofier, MPPGA and Dr. Ross Michael Pink.
World Refugee Day is celebrated annually on June 20 to raise awareness of the challenges that refugees face around the world. There are some 26 million refugees worldwide, roughly the same as the population of Australia. Studies found that by 2050, that number could be 20 times higher as a result of climate change impacts, with up to 500 million refugees.
The 1951 Refugee Convention is the key legal document that guides how countries around the world should protect refugees. However, the pact that was signed nearly seven decades ago does not mention refugees displaced by climate change, which will put hundreds of millions at risk.
It is time for a new global Refugee Convention that addresses refugees impacted by climate change.
Climate Change Refugees
World War II devastated big parts of the world and forced millions of people to leave their home countries. According to the 1951 agreement, a refugee is “someone unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”
But in recent years, a new type of refugees has emerged in numbers that will eventually stagger humanity. These unfortunate individuals are climate change refugees, forced to flee the forces of a different scale such as drought, flooding, global warming, sea-level rise, and extreme weather.
In places like Kiribati and Maldives, climate change impacts such as coastal erosion and saltwater intrusion have already displaced local communities. The reality of climate change is evident for all who are rationale, and the UN and many scientists have documented the impacts in shocking detail. The repercussions can displace roughly 200 million people by 2050, with some experts projecting the figure could be as high as 500 million.
The increasing number of climate refugees will create a cascade of profound global problems, including intra-state conflicts, political instability, food insecurity, and economic crisis. For example, the refugee crisis of the past years led to the rise of xenophobia and far-right movements in parts of Europe.
Legal Framework
There is currently no legal framework that protects individuals who are forced to leave their homes due to climate-induced natural disasters. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not mention climate refugees, meaning the pact does not give legal protection to such victims.
The world has made some progress concerning the protection of climate refugees. In 2018, world leaders signed the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration to protect migrants who flee their homes due to natural disasters or climate change.
However, the Compact is lacking teeth as it is not legally binding. Additionally, in January 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled that “countries may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.” But it is not clear how threatening the situation must be for an individual to obtain the status of an asylum seeker.
Time to Act
The 1951 Refugee Convention must be amended to include a legal definition of climate refugees. Providing people who flee their homes due to climate-induced natural disasters will give them a legal status they deserve. Additionally, the convention must clearly specify climate refugees’ rights to ensure that recipient countries protect them.
Climate refugees are a complex global problem. There is no silver bullet that can solve a problem of such magnitude, but whatever policy solutions the international community decides to craft will require a strong legal framework.
The human rights obligations inherent in UN membership implore nations to act. It is time for world leaders and the international community to urgently amend the 1951 Refugee Convention to protect the rights and dignity of climate refugees.Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Globe Post.
About the authors: Luthfi Dhofier (@LuthfiDhofier) is a policy analyst and a graduate of the Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs Program at UBC. Ross Michael Pink (@RossMPink) is the author of ‘The Climate Change Crisis: Solutions and Adaption for a Planet in Peril’ and ‘Water Rights in Southeast Asia and India.’ He currently teaches political science at Kwantlen University in Surrey, BC, and previously taught international law at the University of Toronto.
For Indonesia, a total lockdown could have cataclysmic social and economic consequences. A different approach is needed.
As the coronavirus spreads fast in Indonesia, experts believe that the country will become Asia’s new epicenter. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has been criticized for not implementing a nationwide lockdown.
Yet such measures would not be a silver bullet to contain COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus. Other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have flattened the curve while keeping businesses and schools open. Indonesia has a lot to learn from these two countries on how to contain the virus without locking down the whole country.
At the time of publishing, there have been over 12,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia and 870 deaths. Given the lack of widespread testing in a country with a population of 267 million, it is likely that the actual number of cases is far higher than this. According to a study by the University of Indonesia, there could be 1.5 million people infected and 140,000 deaths by the end of May.
Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19
The Indonesian government’s response to the crisis has been lackluster. At the beginning of the outbreak, Health Minister Terawan Agus Putranto famously said that Indonesians are immune to COVID-19 due to their prayers. He also publicly dismissed a report by Harvard researchers that projected infection rates in Indonesia. Similarly, Jokowi deliberately misinformed the public early on to prevent them from panicking.
In the past several weeks, the government has increased its containment measures. Jokowi has established a COVID-19 task force and declared a national emergency. However, experts believe that Indonesia is still behind the curve.
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization, has also urged Jokowi to scale up Indonesia’s COVID-19 response mechanisms. Others believe that the country must implement a nationwide lockdown instead of only a partial one. But Jokowi maintains that this is off the table as he believes there are economic, social, political and security aspects that must be considered.
Indeed, in countries with limited resources like Indonesia, a total lockdown could have devastating consequences such as mass poverty and social unrest. In some parts of Africa, lockdowns have contributed to a rise in violence and hunger.
Alternatively, Indonesia can learn from South Korea and Taiwan as these two countries have successfully contained the coronavirus without implementing a nationwide lockdown. To date, both countries have gradually removed some of the social distancing measures as the number of new infections goes down.
In South Korea, the infection rate has decreased from more than 900 cases a day to just under 10 cases per day. French President Emmanuel Macron and Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven have both contacted South Korea’s president, Moon Jae In, to seek advice on how to combat the virus.
Similarly, despite its close proximity to China (130 kilometers away), Taiwan has effectively managed the outbreak without drastic restrictions. In 2019, 2.71 million Chinese visitors traveled to Taiwan and, as of January, there were dozens of flights between Wuhan — the Chinese city where COVID-19 first emerged — and Taipei every week. Yet at the time of publishing, Taiwan only has 438 confirmed cases of COVID-19.
Learning From South Korea and Taiwan
There are some key principles that Indonesia can emulate from South Korea and Taiwan’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.
First, Indonesia must commit to open and transparent communication. Officials in both South Korea and Taiwan hold daily media briefings to provide the public with timely, accurate and simple updates about the outbreak. Open and transparent communication can increase public engagement, prevent misinformation and stop people from panicking. As South Korea’s Vice Health Minister Kim Gang-Lip suggested, “public participation must be secured through openness and transparency.”
Second, Indonesia should incorporate advanced technology into its containment efforts. In South Korea, the government deployed a smartphone app to track the movements of those who have been ordered to self-quarantine. Additionally, travelers from China are required to download a self-diagnosis app to report their health conditions to the government.
In Taiwan, the government uses an “electronic fence” that utilizes mobile phone signals to track people who are ordered to self-isolate. To ensure compliance, officials receive an alert when cellphones are turned off for more than 15 minutes. The government also integrated databases owned by the National Health Insurance Administration, National Immigration Agency and the Customs Administration to monitor people’s travel and medical history. As more than 70% of Indonesians have access to the internet through mobile phones, the use of advanced technology can significantly improve the government’s containment measures.
Finally, Indonesia must improve its testing capacity. The country has one of the lowest testing rates in the world at 444 tests per 1 million people, compared with 12,488 in South Korea and 2,727 in Taiwan. Although Jokowi has repeatedly called for more testing, it remains to be seen whether or not Indonesia can boost its capacity. Widespread testing would provide reliable data to inform decision-making and enable the government to identify infection hotspots.
For Indonesia, a total lockdown could indeed have cataclysmic social and economic consequences. The country surely needs an alternative approach. Open and transparent communication with the public, combined with widespread testing and the use of advanced technology similar to what South Korea and Taiwan have demonstrated, can help Indonesia manage the pandemic.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
The spread of COVID-19 in developing countries will have catastrophic global consequences. Ottawa’s current $50-million commitment to help developing countries deal with the pandemic is a step in the right direction. However, Canada must do more to assist developing countries to contain the spread of the virus.
To date, advanced economies such as the United States, Italy and France have been suffering the most from the virus. In Canada, more than 11,000 cases have been reported along with 153 deaths. However, the next wave of the outbreak is expected to hit developing countries and the impact will likely devastate their fragile economies and weak health care systems.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated its commitment to mobilize $1 trillion to help countries that are struggling with the economic impact of the coronavirus. The IMF and the World Bank are also working together on emergency programs to help member countries, particularly developing countries and emerging markets.
However, the current aid that has been made available for developing countries will not be sufficient. Since the outbreak began, more than $83 billion worth of capital had fled the emerging markets. According to the IMF chief Kristalina Georgieva, developing countries need at least $2.5 trillion in financial assistance to cope with the pandemic. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has also asked world leaders to provide developing countries with $2 trillion to help them fight the outbreak.
Unlike advanced economies such as Canada, developing countries do not have the wherewithal to contain the virus. Even without the outbreak, many low-income countries relied on foreign aid to survive. Guterres argued that “there are dramatic humanitarian needs for these people even without this pandemic. But now, with COVID-19, we need to do everything possible to prevent the disease from coming to these areas.”
In sub-Saharan Africa, there is only about one doctor per 5,000 people, compared to one for every 300 in Europe. The region is also lacking basic medical tools such as ventilators, beds, and masks. In Mali, for example, there is only roughly one ventilator per one-million people.
Moreover, 41 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is living in poverty. According to the Brookings Institute, the pandemic could reduce sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP by 2.1 percent. In a region where sustained economic growth is desperately needed to lift people out of abject poverty, the economic impact of the coronavirus will create serious economic and social problems.
The outbreak and its economic impact can also fuel political violence in the region. In 2019, political violence in sub-Saharan Africa killed over 2,000 people and displaced thousands more. In places like Kenya and South Africa, COVID-19 containment measures have already turned violent as police used excessive force to enforce lockdowns and curfews.
In the Middle East where some countries are still fighting wars, COVID-19 will escalate sectarian tensions and regional instability. For example, officials in Bahrain have accused Iran of “biological aggression.” The region’s youth unemployment rate is currently one of the highest in the world at 26.1 percent. Measures to contain the virus will likely increase this number and lead to civil unrest.
Many other countries in Asia and Latin America are also facing similar risks.
To date, the government of Canada has only earmarked $50 million to help poor countries deal with coronavirus. Some even suggested that now is not that time for Canada to use its resources to help people in other countries. In his tweet, Conservative leadership candidate Erin O-Toole said: “Foreign aid can wait. Right now, the Trudeau government should prioritize Canadians.”
But ensuring a stable international order is in Canada’s national interests. A major outbreak in developing countries can lead to global security issues such as terrorism, state violence, and refugee crises. All these problems will be detrimental to Canada’s national security.
Currently, Canada only spends about 0.28 percent of its GDP on international development assistance (ODA). Meanwhile, other OECD countries such as Norway and Ireland spend at least 0.7 percent of their GDPs on ODA. Norway has also pledged $30 million to help developing countries fight the coronavirus, despite having a GDP of a mere $402 billion. With a GDP of more than $1.6 trillion, Canada should spend at least $150 million.
The current pandemic requires Canada to step up and demonstrate its global leadership. Providing other countries with the financial resources to contain the spread of the virus will help protect Canadians now and in the future.
Luthfi Dhofier is a policy analyst based in Vancouver. He recently graduated from UBC’s Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs program.