The Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement concluded negotiations in November 2024. The agreement, due to come into force in 2025, has great potential to economically benefit both nations, particularly Indonesia. But there are many challenges that, unless proactively addressed, will prevent Indonesia from taking full advantage of the deal.
The Canada–Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) concluded negotiations in November 2024, with Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau committing to signing the agreement in 2025. While the CEPA has great potential to boost Indonesia’s economy, there are still many challenges that could hinder Indonesia from maximising the benefits of this agreement.
Indonesia and Canada begun negotiating the CEPA in 2021, and after 10 rounds of negotiations, the two countries finally reached a deal. This is Indonesia’s first official economic partnership with a North American country, marking a new chapter of bilateral relations.
Through this agreement, Canada aims to tap into Indonesia’s large consumer market and strengthen its engagement in Southeast Asia, while Indonesia seeks to gain access to North American markets and investments. The agreement will eliminate over 90.5 per cent of import tariffs on Indonesian goods, increase investment and promote greater economic collaboration between the two countries.
The CEPA could help Indonesia realise its aspiration to become a high-income country by 2045. The Canadian government’s economic impact assessment projected that the agreement could increase Indonesia’s GDP by US$1.1 billion and its export to Canada by US$877 million, mainly through increased Indonesian export of clothing and leather products.
While the economic outlook is hopeful, there are still many challenges facing Indonesia. Indonesian exports may struggle in the Canadian market due to limited public awareness of Indonesia and its products. Many Canadians know little of Indonesia and are more familiar with its smaller neighbours, such as Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. According to a 2024 poll by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, only 11 per cent of Canadians consider themselves to be ‘knowledgeable’ about Indonesia. Similarly, most Indonesians are only vaguely aware of Canada.
It is not surprising that bilateral trade has been lacklustre, totalling only US$3.78 billion in 2023. Meanwhile, Vietnam and Thailand respectively exported US$9.85 billion and US$3.63 billion worth of goods to Canada in 2023.
Structural issues, including regulatory complexity, poor infrastructure and a low-skilled workforce, discourage Canadian companies from doing business in Indonesia. According to the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business index, Indonesia is ranked 73 out of 190 countries, indicating that Indonesia has a particularly challenging business environment, which is a deterrent for foreign firms.
The CEPA does not automatically overcome all the barriers to successful economic cooperation between Indonesia and Canada. The implementation of this agreement requires Canada and Indonesia to proactively work together to strengthen economic ties. Canada has already begun working to support the CEPA.
In 2023, Canada set up an Export Development Canada representation office in Jakarta to assist Canadian companies that want to do business in Indonesia. In December 2024, the Team Canada Trade Mission, led by Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development Mary Ng, sent representatives from over 190 Canadian firms and organisations to Indonesia to deepen partnerships between Canadian and Indonesian businesses. The visit also produced several memorandums of understanding between Canadian and Indonesian firms. Further, Canada’s Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen visited Jakarta in February 2025 to meet with Indonesia’s Minister of Environment and Minister for National Development Planning to explore opportunities for further enhancing the economic cooperation between the two countries.
Jakarta must take advantage of the CEPA by delivering reforms that will entice Canadian firms to do business in Indonesia. Though many of Indonesia’s structural issues will take years to resolve, there are practical measures that the Indonesian government should take to help both Canadian and Indonesian firms maximise the benefits of the CEPA.
Just as Canada sent its trade mission to Indonesia in December 2024, Jakarta should send Indonesian firms to Canada, especially firms in key sectors identified in the CEPA, such as agriculture, energy, manufacturing and technology.
Jakarta should also give preferential treatment to Canadian firms who wish to obtain Indonesian business licenses, which currently involves a lengthy and laborious process. This will alleviate the financial burden and uncertainty faced by Canadian firms in Indonesia. The government should also allocate more resources to the Indonesia Trade Promotion Center and Indonesia Trade Attache in Canada to facilitate more commerce activities between Canada and Indonesia.
The government of Indonesia needs to take a proactive role to address existing challenges. The CEPA has great potential to help Indonesia achieve its economic aspirations, but without active participation from Jakarta, the CEPA’s potential will go to waste. Now the CEPA negotiators have returned home, the hard work of building economic ties must begin.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver and serves on the board of the Canada Indonesia Chamber of Commerce.
Co-authored with Randolph Mank, Global Business Executive and former Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
After decades of hesitancy, the Canadian government is now vigorously pursuing relations with Indonesia, the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Officials are negotiating a bilateral comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA).1
Trade talks with Indonesia were launched in 2021, with the sixth session scheduled for this fall. Canadian foreign and trade ministers’ visits to Jakarta earlier this year and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit this month have boosted the momentum. Trudeau announced the establishment of an export development office in Jakarta to be headed by a new Indo-Pacific trade representative, who will no doubt need to co-ordinate with Canada’s already appointed special envoy for the Indo-Pacific.2 This is all happening in parallel with negotiations for a trade deal with ASEAN and these initiatives form a central part of Canada’s earnest Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in 2022.3
Admittedly, most Canadians would have trouble finding Indonesia on a map. Many have heard of its most famous tourist island, Bali, and even about its tiny island neighbour, Singapore. But most are only vaguely aware of Indonesia’s 17,000 islands, with exotic names like Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Borneo and Papua, sprawled across the Indian and Pacific oceans, whose 279 million inhabitants make up the fourth most populous country in the world.4 Similarly, Indonesians would have scant awareness of Canada, too. They are not a major source of immigration and the diaspora is negligible, certainly dwarfed by fellow ASEAN members the Philippines and Vietnam.
So it’s worth sorting out hope versus reality in our pursuit of a comprehensive economic partnership.
With a GDP of $1.5 trillion, Indonesia is already the 16th largest economy, just behind Spain, and growing.5 Goldman Sachs projects it to become the fourth largest economy in the world by 2050.6 Unlike its aging ASEAN neighbours, over 50 per cent of Indonesia’s population is between 18 and 39 years old, which makes it one of the fastest growing consumer markets and labour forces in the world.7 It is, therefore, a potentially large market if Canadian companies wish to pursue it.
Yet current bilateral trade is a rather modest $6 billion, not quite the equivalent of two days of trade with the U.S., which totals $1.2 trillion annually.8 Indonesia imports mostly wheat, fertilizer and wood pulp from us and sells us machinery, rubber and textiles in return.9 Our wheat exports make particular sense: the world’s largest flour mill is the ever-expanding Bogasari Mill, owned by Indofood at the port of Jakarta.10
Canadian companies have invested some $5.7 billion in Indonesia. The government has also donated over $1 billion in development assistance since the year 2000 alone. Indonesian investment in Canada stands at only $126 million by comparison.11 Much smaller Malaysia actually remains Canada’s largest ASEAN investment partner. Despite being scaled back from its original $36 billion investment, its national energy company, Petronas, still holds a 25 per cent stake in LNG Canada, worth some $18 billion.12
The relatively limited nature of bilateral exchange with Indonesia means that trade negotiators must comb through trade data to look for areas where more commerce could be stimulated through tariff reductions and other regulatory changes. For those not familiar with trade negotiations, those trade data are found in the harmonized system (HS) codes compiled by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which includes some 5,300 export and import product descriptions arranged in 99 chapters and grouped in 21 sections.13 If that’s not laborious enough, negotiators must also ensure that the affected domestic industries must be thoroughly consulted on any new commitments and cohere with those already made in the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bilateral agreements, including the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). It’s complex and tedious, to say the least.
Increased trade and investment are worthy goals, but broader bilateral co-operation faces headwinds.
On Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy, it’s true that Indonesia sits across from Malaysia alongside the Malacca Strait, through which some 25 per cent of world trade, including oil, flows.14 Theoretically, it could be pivotal should a U.S.-China conflict ever lead to a shipping blockade. It’s also true that Indonesia’s “independent and active” (“bebas aktif”) foreign policy makes it a potential player in geopolitics.15 But it would take very special circumstances to make it an actual security partner in any regional conflict. Nor would Canada have much to contribute to the region’s security, besides solidarity, despite ASEAN signing on Canada as a strategic partner during Trudeau’s visit.
Like all countries, Indonesia follows its own interests. It participates in both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.16 Despite a maritime dispute, China is its largest trading partner by far at $65 billion bilaterally last year, purchasing such valuable Indonesian commodities as oil, coal and minerals. Trade with the U.S., Japan and India follows far behind in the low $20 billion range each.17 Clearly, Indonesia would be reluctant to participate willingly in any such blockade, or even to take sides, if it ever came to that. Notably, there are no U.S. military bases in Indonesia.
As a potential Indo-Pacific ally, or not, it’s good that Indonesia seems to have put its history of troubled relations with neighbouring Australia behind it. Still, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has criticized the World Bank and the IMF and called for a new international economic system focusing on emerging powers.18 Though he hasn’t yet decided on joining the growing BRICS group of countries, he seems to share its goals.
Indonesia does not appear to be an obvious partner for our progressive foreign policy agenda, either. True, it has emerged from authoritarian rule to become a vibrant democracy. But as the world’s largest Muslim country and a founder and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),19 its socio-political culture and foreign policy are inherently distinct from ours. While most Indonesians practise a moderate form of Islam, conservative pressures have increased in recent years. Former Jakarta governor Basuki Purnama, known as Ahok, was jailed for two years on charges of blasphemy for insulting the Qur’an.20 Recently, the government has also formally banned sex outside of marriage.21
There are also uncertainties around democratic continuity. The leading candidate in next year’s presidential elections is Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, a former general and an avowed authoritarian populist with a troubling human rights record.22 Indonesia’s still fragile democracy could face a setback if Prabowo wins.
So if trade is modest and geopolitical interests and foreign and domestic policy diverge, where might we find tangible overlapping interests? One interesting niche area relates to automobiles, our largest economic sector. The Canadian government has set a policy of ensuring that by 2035 all new light-duty vehicles sold will be electric (EVs).23 With the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act pouring billions of dollars into EV battery production, Canada has had to keep pace in the integrated North American auto sector.24 Up to $15 billion in taxpayer-funded incentives have been announced for battery plants being built by Stellantis in Windsor and Volkswagen in St. Thomas, Ontario.25
What does that have to do with Indonesia? Most EV batteries contain up to 80 per cent nickel. We mostly hear about China’s dominance in refining minerals, which is very real. But the world’s largest producer of nickel happens to be Indonesia, with 37 per cent of world market share (followed far behind by the Philippines at 14 per cent and Russia at nine per cent; Canada is sixth with five per cent of market share).26 Indonesia is also second after the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the source of cobalt, another important ingredient.27
Coincidentally, Indonesia achieved this position with the help of Canadian mining company Inco, then the world’s largest nickel mining company and the largest investor in Indonesia’s mining sector. In addition to its operations in Sudbury, Ontario, Inco has been mining nickel in Sulawesi since 1968.
Before imagining that this automatically benefits Canada, consider the complex nature of the global nickel mining business. Brazilian mining giant Vale bought Inco Canada for $19 billion in 2006. Vale now owns the Indonesian mine, as well as Canada’s largest nickel mining operation at Voisey’s Bay in Newfoundland and Labrador and the Thompson mine in Manitoba. Glencore of Switzerland actually owns the Raglan mine in Quebec and another in Sudbury, as well. Canada still has 127 of the more than 186 nickel mines in operation globally.28 We export just over $5 billion worth of nickel annually, while we import just under $1 billion as well, mostly from the U.S.29
But the most relevant issue is pricing. The Indonesian government is a potential market mover. It has also signalled its intention to export into the EV battery supply chain and has introduced a law prohibiting the export of unrefined ore, both measures aimed at attracting investment and maintaining favourable export pricing.30 Even if Canada’s domestic nickel production were to increase, the corporations involved in EV battery production would still have to pay world prices determined in large measure by Indonesia.
Whether this leaves Indonesia as a partner or a competitor is hard to assess. We do not import nickel from Indonesia and securing favourable supplies from Indonesia is not in our Indo-Pacific Strategy. Chinese investors, by contrast, are already moving in.
Again, while pondering this rather inadvertent link with Indonesia, it’s wise to maintain a realistic business perspective. Indonesia is about as far away from Canada as one can travel around the globe before starting to come back. Distance does matter for supply chains, which we are allegedly trying to bring closer to home. So does corruption. Transparency International ranks Indonesia 110th out of 180 countries on its corruption rankings. (Least corrupt at number one is Denmark; Canada ranks 14th.)31 This is a very real problem for Canadians doing business there, and Indonesian courts are not known for consistent adjudication. Occasionally, Canadians have been imprisoned for minor offences, leading to bilateral consular irritants. Before being released in 2019, Canadian teacher Neil Bantleman spent five years in prison in Indonesia for crimes he did not commit.32
On human rights, Indonesia rejected a UN motion to debate China’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims.33 Indonesia’s Chinese minorities, which tend to dominate the business sector, have also suffered violent attacks during periods of political upheaval.34 And those mining operations mentioned above have faced citizen protests over large-scale environmental damage and local human rights abuses.35 In an infamous historical footnote, it was actually protests against former Indonesian president Suharto’s government that led to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police using pepper spray to disperse demonstrators at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vancouver in November 1997.36
Last, but not least, Indonesia has severe infrastructure problems. Its capital city, Jakarta, is actually sinking so fast that in 2022, the government began work on building Nusantara, a new capital 1,000 kilometres away in East Kalimantan, Borneo. It’s scheduled to be inaugurated in August 2024 and proceed in phases.37 Like other countries, Canada will have to decide when and if to shift its embassy. As the megaproject comes to fruition, it will be highly disruptive to regular political, commercial and consular business.
None of this is meant to rain on the current bilateral parade. Far from it. Positive sentiment on both sides is most welcome. If the respective business communities respond as they should to the efforts the two governments are making, trade and investment in commodities and other products and services should grow in quantity and value. But the inevitable challenges and frustrations along the way for these two very distant and different countries could be exacerbated by inflated expectations. In navigating the way forward, wide-eyed pragmatism will provide a better foundation than naïve hope.
7 Guy Allison, Chloe De Schryver, Jane Goldthorpe, Emily Gunn, Claire Jansen, Tegan Morris and Mollie Nielsen, “Next Generation Indonesia,” The British Council, October 2022, doi.org/10.57884/8B8K-B514.
16 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Indonesia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A Pivotal State’s Hedging Strategy,” Asian Politics & Policy, April 19, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12629.
Randolph Mank is a former Canadian diplomat and business executive in Asia. He heads MankGlobal consulting, serves on boards and is a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Triple Helix and the Balsillie School of International Affairs.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver Chapter. He has worked as a policy analyst for various public, private, and non-profit institutions across Canada. He holds a Masters in Public Policy and Global Affairs from the University of British Columbia specializing in global climate policy.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.
In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.
Moreover, the government has received criticisms for its failure to conduct widespread testing. Despite the recent effort to increase the country’s COVID-19 testing capacity, Indonesia’s testing rate is still one of the lowest in the world, with 264 tests per one million people. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Thailand have testing rates of 4,063 and 2,043 per one million people, respectively. According to a senior member of Indonesia’s COVID-19 taskforce, nearly 20,000 suspected coronavirus carriers in the country have not been tested.
Additionally, there has been poor coordination between the central government and the provincial governments, which created more confusion among the public and government officials. Jokowi’s inconsistent statements regarding the authority of provincial governments to impose local lockdowns have created conflicting policies at the central and provincial levels.
The government’s mishandling of the crisis is not only undermining the government’s credibility in fighting the outbreak, but also putting the people at serious health risks. The continued rise in COVID-19 infections is now putting enormous pressure on the country’s already fragile health care system. Indonesia only has 12 hospital beds and 4 doctors per thousand people. As a comparison, South Korea has 115 hospital beds and 24 doctors per thousand people.
With its limited financial and health care resources, Indonesia should respond to this current health crisis proactively and strategically. While there has been a series of setbacks, it is not too late for the government to fix its mistakes and turn the tide around. But the Indonesian government must show leadership and design policies based on scientific evidence. Additionally, the central government must ensure transparency and proper coordination with other levels of government.
For Indonesia, a total lockdown could have cataclysmic social and economic consequences. A different approach is needed.
As the coronavirus spreads fast in Indonesia, experts believe that the country will become Asia’s new epicenter. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has been criticized for not implementing a nationwide lockdown.
Yet such measures would not be a silver bullet to contain COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus. Other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan have flattened the curve while keeping businesses and schools open. Indonesia has a lot to learn from these two countries on how to contain the virus without locking down the whole country.
At the time of publishing, there have been over 12,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia and 870 deaths. Given the lack of widespread testing in a country with a population of 267 million, it is likely that the actual number of cases is far higher than this. According to a study by the University of Indonesia, there could be 1.5 million people infected and 140,000 deaths by the end of May.
Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19
The Indonesian government’s response to the crisis has been lackluster. At the beginning of the outbreak, Health Minister Terawan Agus Putranto famously said that Indonesians are immune to COVID-19 due to their prayers. He also publicly dismissed a report by Harvard researchers that projected infection rates in Indonesia. Similarly, Jokowi deliberately misinformed the public early on to prevent them from panicking.
In the past several weeks, the government has increased its containment measures. Jokowi has established a COVID-19 task force and declared a national emergency. However, experts believe that Indonesia is still behind the curve.
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization, has also urged Jokowi to scale up Indonesia’s COVID-19 response mechanisms. Others believe that the country must implement a nationwide lockdown instead of only a partial one. But Jokowi maintains that this is off the table as he believes there are economic, social, political and security aspects that must be considered.
Indeed, in countries with limited resources like Indonesia, a total lockdown could have devastating consequences such as mass poverty and social unrest. In some parts of Africa, lockdowns have contributed to a rise in violence and hunger.
Alternatively, Indonesia can learn from South Korea and Taiwan as these two countries have successfully contained the coronavirus without implementing a nationwide lockdown. To date, both countries have gradually removed some of the social distancing measures as the number of new infections goes down.
In South Korea, the infection rate has decreased from more than 900 cases a day to just under 10 cases per day. French President Emmanuel Macron and Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven have both contacted South Korea’s president, Moon Jae In, to seek advice on how to combat the virus.
Similarly, despite its close proximity to China (130 kilometers away), Taiwan has effectively managed the outbreak without drastic restrictions. In 2019, 2.71 million Chinese visitors traveled to Taiwan and, as of January, there were dozens of flights between Wuhan — the Chinese city where COVID-19 first emerged — and Taipei every week. Yet at the time of publishing, Taiwan only has 438 confirmed cases of COVID-19.
Learning From South Korea and Taiwan
There are some key principles that Indonesia can emulate from South Korea and Taiwan’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.
First, Indonesia must commit to open and transparent communication. Officials in both South Korea and Taiwan hold daily media briefings to provide the public with timely, accurate and simple updates about the outbreak. Open and transparent communication can increase public engagement, prevent misinformation and stop people from panicking. As South Korea’s Vice Health Minister Kim Gang-Lip suggested, “public participation must be secured through openness and transparency.”
Second, Indonesia should incorporate advanced technology into its containment efforts. In South Korea, the government deployed a smartphone app to track the movements of those who have been ordered to self-quarantine. Additionally, travelers from China are required to download a self-diagnosis app to report their health conditions to the government.
In Taiwan, the government uses an “electronic fence” that utilizes mobile phone signals to track people who are ordered to self-isolate. To ensure compliance, officials receive an alert when cellphones are turned off for more than 15 minutes. The government also integrated databases owned by the National Health Insurance Administration, National Immigration Agency and the Customs Administration to monitor people’s travel and medical history. As more than 70% of Indonesians have access to the internet through mobile phones, the use of advanced technology can significantly improve the government’s containment measures.
Finally, Indonesia must improve its testing capacity. The country has one of the lowest testing rates in the world at 444 tests per 1 million people, compared with 12,488 in South Korea and 2,727 in Taiwan. Although Jokowi has repeatedly called for more testing, it remains to be seen whether or not Indonesia can boost its capacity. Widespread testing would provide reliable data to inform decision-making and enable the government to identify infection hotspots.
For Indonesia, a total lockdown could indeed have cataclysmic social and economic consequences. The country surely needs an alternative approach. Open and transparent communication with the public, combined with widespread testing and the use of advanced technology similar to what South Korea and Taiwan have demonstrated, can help Indonesia manage the pandemic.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
In the wake of terror attacks that rocked the city of Surabaya in May 2018, Indonesia’s parliament has unanimously passed an amendment to its antiterrorism law. Initially proposed in 2016, the law was put on hold after the parliament members could not agree on what constitutes terrorism. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) had threatened to issue a government in lieu of law (perrpu) if the parliament could not pass the law by June. The new law provides the law enforcers with greater powers to carry out their duties.
Rights groups have argued that the new law would undermine human rights in the country. In an open letter to Indonesia’s House of Representative, Amnesty International expresses its concerns about the new antiterrorism law. Indonesia’s Minister of Law and Human Rights Yasona Laoly maintains that the new law is in line with human rights standards. Antiterrorism laws and policies have always been a contentious subject, particularly with respect to human rights.
While the new antiterrorism law serves as an essential legal foundation to improve the law enforcers’ capacity in combating terrorism, Indonesia must seriously improve its “soft power” measures to counter the spread of hardline ideologies that often translate to terror attacks.
The Rise of Terror Attacks and Religious Incidents in Indonesia
The deadliest terrorist incident in Indonesia occurred in 2002 when a Jihadist detonated a bomb at a nightclub in Bali, killing at least 200 people and injuring 200 more. Many of those who were killed in the explosion were foreigners, putting Indonesia in an international spotlight. Shortly thereafter, terrorism became the main security concern for Indonesia’s government.
After a decade of considerable success in counterterrorism measures, Indonesia saw a resurgence of terror attacks. Many of these attacks were inspired by ISIS. Since 2013, there have been at least 930 Indonesians who have travelled to Syria to join ISIS, including women and children. According to Moeldoko, the Chief of Staff of the Presidency, there are currently 590 Indonesian Jihadists in Syria, while 86 of them have returned home.
The recent attacks on churches in Surabaya that killed 26 people and injured at least 50 were also ISIS-affiliated. The Surabaya attacks marked a shift in the nature of terrorism in Indonesia. In the past, the perpetrators had all been men; whilst in Surabaya, women and children were involved in the attacks. This has never been seen before. What the Surabaya attacks indicate is that hardline ideologies have become appealing to not only adult men but also women and children.
Indonesia has been praised for its “moderate” version of Islam, where Muslims embrace elements of Buddhism, Hinduism, and animism while living relatively peacefully with other religious groups. However, Indonesia’s moderate Islam has dwindled in recent years. A study by The Wahid Institute found that 60 percent of high students in Indonesia would join violent jihadist movements. The PEW Research also found that 72 percent of Indonesians are in favor of making sharia the law of the land.
These developments indicate that Indonesia has gradually become a fertile ground for hardline ideologies that often translate into violent acts.
Tougher Anti Terrorism Law
There are several key aspects of the new law that will improve antiterrorism measures in Indonesia.
First, the new law expands Indonesia’s definition of terrorism. Under the new law, terrorism constitutes “the use of violence or threats to inflict a widespread terror and fear, that could lead to considerable loss of lives and/or destruction of strategic vital objects, environment, and public/international properties with political/ideological motives.”
Second, the new law extends the detention period from seven to fourteen days before a person is identified as a terrorist suspect, and extends the pre-trial detention period from six months to nine months, without the court’s approval.
Third, the new law grants the Indonesian military (TNI) a direct involvement in antiterrorism activities. However, TNI may only participate in antiterrorism activities when it is requested by the police and approved by the president.
In light of concerns over human rights violations, Indonesia’s lawmakers incorporated several articles that would govern the adherence to human rights principles. For example, article 25 subparagraphs 7 and 8 stipulate that the detention of suspected terrorists must be carried out while upholding human rights principles and any official who violates these standards would be prosecuted according to law.
Will The Law Be Enough To Prevent Future Attacks?
Tougher antiterrorism legislation is only one facet of a broader counterterrorism strategy. The government of Indonesia must also intensify its de-radicalization measures. During a meeting at the State Palace, Jokowi has indicated his commitment to balancing “hard power” and “soft power” approaches, without providing further details on what this soft power entails.
However, to mitigate the spread of radical ideologies, Indonesia must first ensure that its deradicalization programs targets not only men who have been engaged with militant groups, but also their families and close affiliates. As the Surabaya attacks demonstrated, women, children, affiliates of those former jihadists are also prone to committing terror attacks.
In addition to educating and integrating former jihadists and their affiliates, the government must address the spread of radical ideologies in Indonesia’s educational institutions, particularly in private Islamic schools.
Finally, the government must continue to work with moderate Islamic groups such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to promote and re-invigorate “moderate” Islam, the Islam that had been thriving in the archipelago for centuries.
(Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met today with Indonesian President Joko Widodo on the margins of the G20 Summit in Turkey – source: Prime Minister’s Office of Canada archive)
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to China is an important foreign policy move, but there is one country in the Asia Pacific that Canada should not ignore.
The relationship between Canada and Indonesia traces back to 1948 when Canada became one of the first countries to recognize Indonesia’s independence. Shortly thereafter, the formal bilateral relationship between the two countries was established. Unfortunately, Canada has yet to be successful with capitalizing on the economic opportunities from the relationship. A 2016 report by the Centre for International Governance Cooperation (CIGC) found that there is a serious deficit in mutual awareness between Canadians and Indonesians. Indonesia is currently the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of economy, population and geography. It is a diverse nation whereby 50% of its 250-million population is under the age of thirty. According to the McKinsey Global Institute (2012), Indonesia is poised to be the seventh largest economy by 2030. As Canada looks to boost its global footprint, it needs to seriously improve its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. A strong Canada-Indonesia relationship will make Canada a stronger player in the Asia Pacific.
Canada and Indonesia share an array of similarities that could serve as a foundation for a stronger, long-term bilateral relationship. First, the two countries have a democratic, multiparty political system. As a matter of fact, Indonesia is considered to be the only country in Southeast Asia with a Western-style democratic system. Second, the two countries are largely multicultural. There are currently more than 200 ethnic groups in Indonesia, speaking over 700 languages. Third, both countries are members of major international blocs such as the G20 and APEC.
There are four key areas where Canada can improve its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. First, Canada must enhance its diplomatic relationship with Indonesia by officially upgrading the relationship to a tier-one relationship by 2020. Canada needs to place Indonesia as Canada’s main strategic partner in Southeast Asia. Second, Canada needs to upgrade its security relationship with Indonesia by initiating high-level military cooperation. Third, Canada must reinvigorate its economic relationship with Indonesia. Trade between the two countries currently stands at a mere $3.5 billion while the two countries’ combined GDP is close to $3 trillion. Therefore, total trade can definitely be improved. Fourth, Canada must increase educational assistance to Indonesia. Canada’s excellent post-secondary education system is undoubtedly enticing to Indonesia’s large young population. By promoting Canada’s education system in Indonesia, and awarding more scholarships to Indonesian students, the two countries could have a stronger cultural, people-to-people relationship. This will also accrue to other areas such as enhanced economic cooperation, governance, and security.
Canada’s most recent initiative with regard to its relationship with Indonesia was its $14.25 injection to infrastructure development in Indonesia. However, there has yet to be a substantial effort from senior-level Canadian bureaucrats in demonstrating Canada’s commitment to Indonesia. To be fair, the Indonesian government has not been showing its commitment to Canada either. Canada could potentially be a strong North American ally for Indonesia considering the recent United States’ withdrawal from the global diplomacy under the Trump administration. The last time an Indonesian President officially visited Canada was back in 1956 when Sukarno visited Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in Ottawa. This illustrates how distant the two countries are from the bilateral relationship standpoint. Although it takes ‘two to tango,’ as a developed country that is in more of a position for global outreach, it is time for Canada to take the first step in strengthening its bilateral relationship with this large yet unknown Southeast Asian nation.