Joining the bloc would undermine Canada’s global autonomy precisely at a moment when independence and flexibility are strategic assets. Ottawa must deepen its partnership with the EU without joining it, while continuing to build partnerships abroad as an independent middle power.
VANCOUVER, B.C.—The idea is seductive. Confronted with an erratic Washington that continues to use tariffs as a weapon, Canadians are looking at the Atlantic and asking: what if we belong there?
Recent polls by Nanos Research and Spark Advocacy found Canadians are warming up to the idea of formal European Union membership. Some European leaders, including Finnish President Alexander Stubb, have also endorsed Canada’s formal integration into the EU.
The instinct is understandable. Canada and the EU share similar values, history, culture, and interests in a rules-based international order. But the conclusion does not follow. In his speech in Davos earlier this year, Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that the world is in the midst of “a rupture, not a transition,” and many countries are coming to the conclusion that they must develop strategic autonomy. This is the correct diagnosis. For Canada, strategic autonomy is the correct response.
Joining the bloc would undermine Canada’s global autonomy precisely at a moment when independence and flexibility are strategic assets. Ottawa must deepen its partnership with the EU without joining it, while continuing to build partnerships abroad as an independent middle power.
The case for EU membership rests on two key arguments: economic security and security alignment. But Canada has developed a strategic partnership model where these benefits can be captured without formally joining the bloc.
On economic partnership, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has eliminated 98 per cent of tariffs between Canada and the EU across goods, services, and investments. On security, NATO has provided Canada and the EU with a collective security framework for over seven decades. Recently, Canada joined the SAFE instrument, which gives Canada access to a 150-billion euro defence procurement program. These frameworks show that Canada can achieve deep integration with the EU without joining it.
Under EU law, trade policy and negotiations are the exclusive purview of the EU. As a member state, existing trade agreements such as the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would either need to be renegotiated within the EU framework, or abandoned altogether.
Consider CUSMA, which shields roughly 86 to 90 per cent of Canadian exports from U.S. tariffs, equivalent to 19 per cent of Canada’s GDP. Canada would lose that protection and be subject to the EU’s less favourable trade relationships with the U.S. Canada would also have to leave the CPTPP, which covers 580 million consumers across key Indo-Pacific economies.
The global economic centre of gravity is shifting. According to Goldman Sachs and PwC, by mid century, the top five global economic powers will be dominated by the Indo-Pacific countries: China, India, and Indonesia. Joining the EU would mean that Canada would lose the power to negotiate trade agreements with these countries in ways that reflect its national interests.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires member states to align their foreign policy positions with the EU on issues such as sanctions, state recognition, United Nations votes, and responses to international conflicts. As a member state, Canada would face greater pressure to align its foreign policy positions with Brussels. The creation of the UN Peacekeeping mission, our diplomatic re-engagement with China in the 1970s, and the 1997 Land Mines Treaty show that this country’s global strength comes not from the size of our military or economy, but from our ability to act independently and serve as an honest broker when it matters most.
EU membership would not only restrain what Canada can do. It would strip away one of its greatest international assets.
Canada should continue to deepen its partnership with the EU without joining it.
On trade, we can work together with the EU to strengthen CETA. The European Commission found that 40 per cent of eligible Canadian exporters have not claimed CETA tariff reductions. Ottawa should also continue to deepen security partnerships under existing frameworks.
Finally, this country must continue to pursue its current path of global diversification, deepening partnerships with key partners globally, while maintaining its status as an independent middle power. Canada’s future should not be confined to Europe. It must be global.
Carney has called Canada the “most European country outside of Europe.” The affinity is real. But Canada does not need to join the EU to be in Europe. It can do so as a partner, not a member.
Luthfi Dhofier is president of the Canadian International Council Vancouver and CEO of Meridian Gate Advisory. He has co-authored and edited two books on human security, and writes on international affairs and trade.
The Canada-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement concluded negotiations in November 2024. The agreement, due to come into force in 2025, has great potential to economically benefit both nations, particularly Indonesia. But there are many challenges that, unless proactively addressed, will prevent Indonesia from taking full advantage of the deal.
The Canada–Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) concluded negotiations in November 2024, with Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau committing to signing the agreement in 2025. While the CEPA has great potential to boost Indonesia’s economy, there are still many challenges that could hinder Indonesia from maximising the benefits of this agreement.
Indonesia and Canada begun negotiating the CEPA in 2021, and after 10 rounds of negotiations, the two countries finally reached a deal. This is Indonesia’s first official economic partnership with a North American country, marking a new chapter of bilateral relations.
Through this agreement, Canada aims to tap into Indonesia’s large consumer market and strengthen its engagement in Southeast Asia, while Indonesia seeks to gain access to North American markets and investments. The agreement will eliminate over 90.5 per cent of import tariffs on Indonesian goods, increase investment and promote greater economic collaboration between the two countries.
The CEPA could help Indonesia realise its aspiration to become a high-income country by 2045. The Canadian government’s economic impact assessment projected that the agreement could increase Indonesia’s GDP by US$1.1 billion and its export to Canada by US$877 million, mainly through increased Indonesian export of clothing and leather products.
While the economic outlook is hopeful, there are still many challenges facing Indonesia. Indonesian exports may struggle in the Canadian market due to limited public awareness of Indonesia and its products. Many Canadians know little of Indonesia and are more familiar with its smaller neighbours, such as Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore. According to a 2024 poll by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, only 11 per cent of Canadians consider themselves to be ‘knowledgeable’ about Indonesia. Similarly, most Indonesians are only vaguely aware of Canada.
It is not surprising that bilateral trade has been lacklustre, totalling only US$3.78 billion in 2023. Meanwhile, Vietnam and Thailand respectively exported US$9.85 billion and US$3.63 billion worth of goods to Canada in 2023.
Structural issues, including regulatory complexity, poor infrastructure and a low-skilled workforce, discourage Canadian companies from doing business in Indonesia. According to the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business index, Indonesia is ranked 73 out of 190 countries, indicating that Indonesia has a particularly challenging business environment, which is a deterrent for foreign firms.
The CEPA does not automatically overcome all the barriers to successful economic cooperation between Indonesia and Canada. The implementation of this agreement requires Canada and Indonesia to proactively work together to strengthen economic ties. Canada has already begun working to support the CEPA.
In 2023, Canada set up an Export Development Canada representation office in Jakarta to assist Canadian companies that want to do business in Indonesia. In December 2024, the Team Canada Trade Mission, led by Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development Mary Ng, sent representatives from over 190 Canadian firms and organisations to Indonesia to deepen partnerships between Canadian and Indonesian businesses. The visit also produced several memorandums of understanding between Canadian and Indonesian firms. Further, Canada’s Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen visited Jakarta in February 2025 to meet with Indonesia’s Minister of Environment and Minister for National Development Planning to explore opportunities for further enhancing the economic cooperation between the two countries.
Jakarta must take advantage of the CEPA by delivering reforms that will entice Canadian firms to do business in Indonesia. Though many of Indonesia’s structural issues will take years to resolve, there are practical measures that the Indonesian government should take to help both Canadian and Indonesian firms maximise the benefits of the CEPA.
Just as Canada sent its trade mission to Indonesia in December 2024, Jakarta should send Indonesian firms to Canada, especially firms in key sectors identified in the CEPA, such as agriculture, energy, manufacturing and technology.
Jakarta should also give preferential treatment to Canadian firms who wish to obtain Indonesian business licenses, which currently involves a lengthy and laborious process. This will alleviate the financial burden and uncertainty faced by Canadian firms in Indonesia. The government should also allocate more resources to the Indonesia Trade Promotion Center and Indonesia Trade Attache in Canada to facilitate more commerce activities between Canada and Indonesia.
The government of Indonesia needs to take a proactive role to address existing challenges. The CEPA has great potential to help Indonesia achieve its economic aspirations, but without active participation from Jakarta, the CEPA’s potential will go to waste. Now the CEPA negotiators have returned home, the hard work of building economic ties must begin.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver and serves on the board of the Canada Indonesia Chamber of Commerce.
Co-authored with Randolph Mank, Global Business Executive and former Canadian Ambassador to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
After decades of hesitancy, the Canadian government is now vigorously pursuing relations with Indonesia, the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Officials are negotiating a bilateral comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA).1
Trade talks with Indonesia were launched in 2021, with the sixth session scheduled for this fall. Canadian foreign and trade ministers’ visits to Jakarta earlier this year and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit this month have boosted the momentum. Trudeau announced the establishment of an export development office in Jakarta to be headed by a new Indo-Pacific trade representative, who will no doubt need to co-ordinate with Canada’s already appointed special envoy for the Indo-Pacific.2 This is all happening in parallel with negotiations for a trade deal with ASEAN and these initiatives form a central part of Canada’s earnest Indo-Pacific Strategy, launched in 2022.3
Admittedly, most Canadians would have trouble finding Indonesia on a map. Many have heard of its most famous tourist island, Bali, and even about its tiny island neighbour, Singapore. But most are only vaguely aware of Indonesia’s 17,000 islands, with exotic names like Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Borneo and Papua, sprawled across the Indian and Pacific oceans, whose 279 million inhabitants make up the fourth most populous country in the world.4 Similarly, Indonesians would have scant awareness of Canada, too. They are not a major source of immigration and the diaspora is negligible, certainly dwarfed by fellow ASEAN members the Philippines and Vietnam.
So it’s worth sorting out hope versus reality in our pursuit of a comprehensive economic partnership.
With a GDP of $1.5 trillion, Indonesia is already the 16th largest economy, just behind Spain, and growing.5 Goldman Sachs projects it to become the fourth largest economy in the world by 2050.6 Unlike its aging ASEAN neighbours, over 50 per cent of Indonesia’s population is between 18 and 39 years old, which makes it one of the fastest growing consumer markets and labour forces in the world.7 It is, therefore, a potentially large market if Canadian companies wish to pursue it.
Yet current bilateral trade is a rather modest $6 billion, not quite the equivalent of two days of trade with the U.S., which totals $1.2 trillion annually.8 Indonesia imports mostly wheat, fertilizer and wood pulp from us and sells us machinery, rubber and textiles in return.9 Our wheat exports make particular sense: the world’s largest flour mill is the ever-expanding Bogasari Mill, owned by Indofood at the port of Jakarta.10
Canadian companies have invested some $5.7 billion in Indonesia. The government has also donated over $1 billion in development assistance since the year 2000 alone. Indonesian investment in Canada stands at only $126 million by comparison.11 Much smaller Malaysia actually remains Canada’s largest ASEAN investment partner. Despite being scaled back from its original $36 billion investment, its national energy company, Petronas, still holds a 25 per cent stake in LNG Canada, worth some $18 billion.12
The relatively limited nature of bilateral exchange with Indonesia means that trade negotiators must comb through trade data to look for areas where more commerce could be stimulated through tariff reductions and other regulatory changes. For those not familiar with trade negotiations, those trade data are found in the harmonized system (HS) codes compiled by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which includes some 5,300 export and import product descriptions arranged in 99 chapters and grouped in 21 sections.13 If that’s not laborious enough, negotiators must also ensure that the affected domestic industries must be thoroughly consulted on any new commitments and cohere with those already made in the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bilateral agreements, including the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). It’s complex and tedious, to say the least.
Increased trade and investment are worthy goals, but broader bilateral co-operation faces headwinds.
On Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy, it’s true that Indonesia sits across from Malaysia alongside the Malacca Strait, through which some 25 per cent of world trade, including oil, flows.14 Theoretically, it could be pivotal should a U.S.-China conflict ever lead to a shipping blockade. It’s also true that Indonesia’s “independent and active” (“bebas aktif”) foreign policy makes it a potential player in geopolitics.15 But it would take very special circumstances to make it an actual security partner in any regional conflict. Nor would Canada have much to contribute to the region’s security, besides solidarity, despite ASEAN signing on Canada as a strategic partner during Trudeau’s visit.
Like all countries, Indonesia follows its own interests. It participates in both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.16 Despite a maritime dispute, China is its largest trading partner by far at $65 billion bilaterally last year, purchasing such valuable Indonesian commodities as oil, coal and minerals. Trade with the U.S., Japan and India follows far behind in the low $20 billion range each.17 Clearly, Indonesia would be reluctant to participate willingly in any such blockade, or even to take sides, if it ever came to that. Notably, there are no U.S. military bases in Indonesia.
As a potential Indo-Pacific ally, or not, it’s good that Indonesia seems to have put its history of troubled relations with neighbouring Australia behind it. Still, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has criticized the World Bank and the IMF and called for a new international economic system focusing on emerging powers.18 Though he hasn’t yet decided on joining the growing BRICS group of countries, he seems to share its goals.
Indonesia does not appear to be an obvious partner for our progressive foreign policy agenda, either. True, it has emerged from authoritarian rule to become a vibrant democracy. But as the world’s largest Muslim country and a founder and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),19 its socio-political culture and foreign policy are inherently distinct from ours. While most Indonesians practise a moderate form of Islam, conservative pressures have increased in recent years. Former Jakarta governor Basuki Purnama, known as Ahok, was jailed for two years on charges of blasphemy for insulting the Qur’an.20 Recently, the government has also formally banned sex outside of marriage.21
There are also uncertainties around democratic continuity. The leading candidate in next year’s presidential elections is Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, a former general and an avowed authoritarian populist with a troubling human rights record.22 Indonesia’s still fragile democracy could face a setback if Prabowo wins.
So if trade is modest and geopolitical interests and foreign and domestic policy diverge, where might we find tangible overlapping interests? One interesting niche area relates to automobiles, our largest economic sector. The Canadian government has set a policy of ensuring that by 2035 all new light-duty vehicles sold will be electric (EVs).23 With the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act pouring billions of dollars into EV battery production, Canada has had to keep pace in the integrated North American auto sector.24 Up to $15 billion in taxpayer-funded incentives have been announced for battery plants being built by Stellantis in Windsor and Volkswagen in St. Thomas, Ontario.25
What does that have to do with Indonesia? Most EV batteries contain up to 80 per cent nickel. We mostly hear about China’s dominance in refining minerals, which is very real. But the world’s largest producer of nickel happens to be Indonesia, with 37 per cent of world market share (followed far behind by the Philippines at 14 per cent and Russia at nine per cent; Canada is sixth with five per cent of market share).26 Indonesia is also second after the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the source of cobalt, another important ingredient.27
Coincidentally, Indonesia achieved this position with the help of Canadian mining company Inco, then the world’s largest nickel mining company and the largest investor in Indonesia’s mining sector. In addition to its operations in Sudbury, Ontario, Inco has been mining nickel in Sulawesi since 1968.
Before imagining that this automatically benefits Canada, consider the complex nature of the global nickel mining business. Brazilian mining giant Vale bought Inco Canada for $19 billion in 2006. Vale now owns the Indonesian mine, as well as Canada’s largest nickel mining operation at Voisey’s Bay in Newfoundland and Labrador and the Thompson mine in Manitoba. Glencore of Switzerland actually owns the Raglan mine in Quebec and another in Sudbury, as well. Canada still has 127 of the more than 186 nickel mines in operation globally.28 We export just over $5 billion worth of nickel annually, while we import just under $1 billion as well, mostly from the U.S.29
But the most relevant issue is pricing. The Indonesian government is a potential market mover. It has also signalled its intention to export into the EV battery supply chain and has introduced a law prohibiting the export of unrefined ore, both measures aimed at attracting investment and maintaining favourable export pricing.30 Even if Canada’s domestic nickel production were to increase, the corporations involved in EV battery production would still have to pay world prices determined in large measure by Indonesia.
Whether this leaves Indonesia as a partner or a competitor is hard to assess. We do not import nickel from Indonesia and securing favourable supplies from Indonesia is not in our Indo-Pacific Strategy. Chinese investors, by contrast, are already moving in.
Again, while pondering this rather inadvertent link with Indonesia, it’s wise to maintain a realistic business perspective. Indonesia is about as far away from Canada as one can travel around the globe before starting to come back. Distance does matter for supply chains, which we are allegedly trying to bring closer to home. So does corruption. Transparency International ranks Indonesia 110th out of 180 countries on its corruption rankings. (Least corrupt at number one is Denmark; Canada ranks 14th.)31 This is a very real problem for Canadians doing business there, and Indonesian courts are not known for consistent adjudication. Occasionally, Canadians have been imprisoned for minor offences, leading to bilateral consular irritants. Before being released in 2019, Canadian teacher Neil Bantleman spent five years in prison in Indonesia for crimes he did not commit.32
On human rights, Indonesia rejected a UN motion to debate China’s persecution of Uyghur Muslims.33 Indonesia’s Chinese minorities, which tend to dominate the business sector, have also suffered violent attacks during periods of political upheaval.34 And those mining operations mentioned above have faced citizen protests over large-scale environmental damage and local human rights abuses.35 In an infamous historical footnote, it was actually protests against former Indonesian president Suharto’s government that led to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police using pepper spray to disperse demonstrators at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vancouver in November 1997.36
Last, but not least, Indonesia has severe infrastructure problems. Its capital city, Jakarta, is actually sinking so fast that in 2022, the government began work on building Nusantara, a new capital 1,000 kilometres away in East Kalimantan, Borneo. It’s scheduled to be inaugurated in August 2024 and proceed in phases.37 Like other countries, Canada will have to decide when and if to shift its embassy. As the megaproject comes to fruition, it will be highly disruptive to regular political, commercial and consular business.
None of this is meant to rain on the current bilateral parade. Far from it. Positive sentiment on both sides is most welcome. If the respective business communities respond as they should to the efforts the two governments are making, trade and investment in commodities and other products and services should grow in quantity and value. But the inevitable challenges and frustrations along the way for these two very distant and different countries could be exacerbated by inflated expectations. In navigating the way forward, wide-eyed pragmatism will provide a better foundation than naïve hope.
7 Guy Allison, Chloe De Schryver, Jane Goldthorpe, Emily Gunn, Claire Jansen, Tegan Morris and Mollie Nielsen, “Next Generation Indonesia,” The British Council, October 2022, doi.org/10.57884/8B8K-B514.
16 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Indonesia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A Pivotal State’s Hedging Strategy,” Asian Politics & Policy, April 19, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12629.
Randolph Mank is a former Canadian diplomat and business executive in Asia. He heads MankGlobal consulting, serves on boards and is a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Triple Helix and the Balsillie School of International Affairs.
Luthfi Dhofier is the President of the Canadian International Council Vancouver Chapter. He has worked as a policy analyst for various public, private, and non-profit institutions across Canada. He holds a Masters in Public Policy and Global Affairs from the University of British Columbia specializing in global climate policy.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
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After Canada lost its bid for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat on June 17, experts quickly blamed Ottawa’s lack of global engagement as the key reason. But Canada’s defeat tells of more than just its foreign policy failure. On many domestic issues, such as the environment and Indigenous rights, Canada’s actions are not consistent with its international obligations.
As one of the founding members of the United Nations (UN), Canada’s defeat in the bid for the UNSC seat is a stark reminder of Canada’s deteriorating global influence. Canada lost to Norway and Ireland in the first round of voting, despite Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s intense and expensive campaign for nearly five years.
The council has the power to deploy peacekeeping operations, impose sanctions, and determine the UN’s response to international security threats. As such, a seat on the UNSC would have enabled Canada to regain its global influence and help shape the future of the world that is becoming more interconnected and complex.
Canada was traditionally known as a middle power that championed a multilateral world. But in recent years, Canada has disengaged itself from the world. Since 1970, Ottawa has continuously reduced its spending on foreign aid. Today, Canada only spends 0.28 per cent of its gross national income (GNI) on international development assistance. Meanwhile, Norway and Ireland spend at least 0.7 per cent of their GNI on foreign aid.
The UN figures found that Canada’s peacekeeping efforts are currently at the lowest level in 60 years. At the end of April 2020, there were only 35 Canadian military and police officers in the UN peacekeeping force, despite its promise to deploy 600 military officers and 250 police officers. It is clear that Canada’s foreign policy does not reflect its rhetoric.
But Canada’s defeat signalled a much deeper problem than just its lack of global engagement. In many domestic issues, such as the environment and Indigenous rights, Canada has failed to uphold the values of the UN.
Despite being a signatory of the Paris Climate Agreement, Canada is one of the worst-performing countries in climate action. With a population of only 37 million people, Canada is one of the world’s top 10 greenhouse gas emitters. Canada is not on track to meet its target to reduce its emissions by 30 per cent below the 2005 level by 2030. According to the UN, Canada will miss its climate target by 15 per cent. A study by the Climate Action Network also found that Canada’s climate plan is in line with the global warming exceeding 4 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level.
Ottawa has indeed instituted measures to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, such as the national carbon pricing framework and investment on clean energy. The federal government has also earmarked $70-billion to address climate change. But at the same time, the government is investing heavily in the fossil fuel industry. Between 2012 and 2017, Export Development Canada (EDC) spent a staggering $62-billion to support the fossil fuel industry. Ottawa also spent $4.5-billion to purchase the Trans Mountain pipeline in 2018.
Canada has also failed to uphold its commitment to Indigenous rights. Although the government of Canada officially adopted the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2016, Ottawa has yet to introduce legislation on UNDRIP. Violations against Indigenous rights continue to persist in Canada. Today, an Indigenous Canadian is 10 times more likely to die at the hands of police officers compared to a white Canadian.
Canada’s mistreatment of Indigenous groups has not gone unnoticed. Most recently, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination urged Ottawa to immediately suspend the construction of the Coastal GasLink pipeline, the Trans Mountain pipeline, and the Site C dam until it obtains “free, prior, and informed consent” from Indigenous peoples. The UN Human Rights Committee also ruled that the Indian Act discriminates against Indigenous women.
Canada cannot portray a moral high ground abroad while failing to address these issues at home. The recent defeat at the UN Security Council bid reveals more than Ottawa’s foreign policy failure. It is also a reminder that Canada’s international obligations extend beyond its global engagement. Therefore, Ottawa must ensure that its actions at home are consistent with its rhetoric.
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(Prime Minister Justin Trudeau met today with Indonesian President Joko Widodo on the margins of the G20 Summit in Turkey – source: Prime Minister’s Office of Canada archive)
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to China is an important foreign policy move, but there is one country in the Asia Pacific that Canada should not ignore.
The relationship between Canada and Indonesia traces back to 1948 when Canada became one of the first countries to recognize Indonesia’s independence. Shortly thereafter, the formal bilateral relationship between the two countries was established. Unfortunately, Canada has yet to be successful with capitalizing on the economic opportunities from the relationship. A 2016 report by the Centre for International Governance Cooperation (CIGC) found that there is a serious deficit in mutual awareness between Canadians and Indonesians. Indonesia is currently the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of economy, population and geography. It is a diverse nation whereby 50% of its 250-million population is under the age of thirty. According to the McKinsey Global Institute (2012), Indonesia is poised to be the seventh largest economy by 2030. As Canada looks to boost its global footprint, it needs to seriously improve its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. A strong Canada-Indonesia relationship will make Canada a stronger player in the Asia Pacific.
Canada and Indonesia share an array of similarities that could serve as a foundation for a stronger, long-term bilateral relationship. First, the two countries have a democratic, multiparty political system. As a matter of fact, Indonesia is considered to be the only country in Southeast Asia with a Western-style democratic system. Second, the two countries are largely multicultural. There are currently more than 200 ethnic groups in Indonesia, speaking over 700 languages. Third, both countries are members of major international blocs such as the G20 and APEC.
There are four key areas where Canada can improve its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. First, Canada must enhance its diplomatic relationship with Indonesia by officially upgrading the relationship to a tier-one relationship by 2020. Canada needs to place Indonesia as Canada’s main strategic partner in Southeast Asia. Second, Canada needs to upgrade its security relationship with Indonesia by initiating high-level military cooperation. Third, Canada must reinvigorate its economic relationship with Indonesia. Trade between the two countries currently stands at a mere $3.5 billion while the two countries’ combined GDP is close to $3 trillion. Therefore, total trade can definitely be improved. Fourth, Canada must increase educational assistance to Indonesia. Canada’s excellent post-secondary education system is undoubtedly enticing to Indonesia’s large young population. By promoting Canada’s education system in Indonesia, and awarding more scholarships to Indonesian students, the two countries could have a stronger cultural, people-to-people relationship. This will also accrue to other areas such as enhanced economic cooperation, governance, and security.
Canada’s most recent initiative with regard to its relationship with Indonesia was its $14.25 injection to infrastructure development in Indonesia. However, there has yet to be a substantial effort from senior-level Canadian bureaucrats in demonstrating Canada’s commitment to Indonesia. To be fair, the Indonesian government has not been showing its commitment to Canada either. Canada could potentially be a strong North American ally for Indonesia considering the recent United States’ withdrawal from the global diplomacy under the Trump administration. The last time an Indonesian President officially visited Canada was back in 1956 when Sukarno visited Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in Ottawa. This illustrates how distant the two countries are from the bilateral relationship standpoint. Although it takes ‘two to tango,’ as a developed country that is in more of a position for global outreach, it is time for Canada to take the first step in strengthening its bilateral relationship with this large yet unknown Southeast Asian nation.